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[T]he failure to have all the relevant tests described in one place, at the
time when product liability law was exploding, has probably meant that
judicial language in the area will never achieve the kind of lucidity one
might have wished for and expected.
Guido Calabresi
When Jon Hirschoff and I set out to write Toward A Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, we had, I think, several objectives in mind. The first was to point out
the fundamental difference between cost-benefit based tests for liability (such
as the Learned Hand Fault test) and tests (such as the one we called the Strict
Liability test) in which the decisionmaker eschewed cost-benefit judgments.
Second, we wished to point out that the recent move to strict liability in torts
could not be explained predominantly on wealth distribution or spreading
grounds, as was commonly stated, but was likely to stem from dissatisfaction
with the meager accomplishments of fault type tests in reducing the sum of
accident and safety costs.
Third, we wanted to emphasize the importance of practical over theoretical
issues in determining which approach to tort liability ought to predominate. In
particular, we wanted to explore the effect that (a) the level of generality at
which a liability rule worked best, (b) the existence of insurance, and (c) the
presence of third party victims, would have on whether fault or strict liability
tests were likely to be most effective in achieving optimal degrees of safety.
Fourth, we hoped to give courts some guidance in product liability cases by
helping them see how strict product liability fit with older examples of non-
fault liability (such as extra hazardous activity liability and assumption of risk),
and how they might approach the question of whom to hold strictly liable.
Finally, we wished to indicate the relationships and tensions between those
goals which focused on yielding an optimal degree of safety and other goals,
like those concerned with distribution of wealth.
While I believe the article succeeded very well in much that it set out to
do, several changes would have made it stronger. First, the article took for
granted that readers and courts would understand that strict liability, as we used
it, did not mean injurer liability, but meant a way of determining when injurers
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and when victims should bear losses regardless of fault. Most of the criticisms
of the piece, including Richard Posner's,1 6 center on this simple (and, if I
may say so, simplistic) misreading of the article. I still believe that our meaning
should have been obvious. How else could one explain the extended discussion
of assumption of risk (which placed losses on faultless victims) as a paradigm,
albeit an often misapplied one, of a strict liability rule? How else could one
deal with the then predominant legislative effort toward what was universally
termed strict liability: first party automobile liability laws, which assigned
losses primarily to the injured party?
Nevertheless, many critics failed to see the point, and therefore necessarily
failed to see the more subtle, and crucially important point, that strict liability
tests, no less than fault tests, could, and often should, divide losses among
injurers and victims in order to optimize safety. This point was explicitly made
in various places (e.g., p. 1068, where the limited liability of a steel mill for
the hand of a worker who is also a great violinist is discussed). But, like the
fact that strict liability could mean victim liability, it should have been empha-
sized more.
Second, the article missed the fact that courts, especially in product liability
cases, were sometimes using a non-fault test which was based on a cost-benefit
analysis and hence differed both from the true fault tests (Learned Hand and
reverse Learned Hand) and what we termed strict liability tests. The definition
of this ex-post, or non-fault Learned Hand test, and its significance, especially
in product liability and nuisance cases, had to wait years for fuller examination
in an article by Calabresi and Klevorick. 147 This delay inevitably made the
Calabresi-Hirschoff article less useful to courts than it might have been. Indeed,
the failure to have all the relevant tests described in one place, at the time when
product liability law was exploding, has probably meant that judicial language
in the area will never achieve the kind of lucidity one might have wished for
and expected.
Finally, while a short piece like the Calabresi-Hirschoff article could not
have done much more than it did, I nevertheless today find the discussion of
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the relationship of the strict liability and fault-based tests to goals other than
safety optimization to be inadequate. The lumping of all other goals together
under the rubric of distribution is not helpful. It combines issues as different
as taste or value shaping with notions of just desert and decisions based on
wealth and class or caste differences. That is not only not useful but inevitably
tends to understate the significance of the goals that are lumped together.
The principal point, that courts and juries have a role to play as to these,
was correct then, and is still. But had we not been so concerned with rebutting
Fletcher's recent article, 11 I think we could have said it, and more, more
profoundly.
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If negligence and strict liability could be subsumed in a new doctrinal
structure in which information about risks and ability to act with
respect to risks are central, it would be worth asking whether we can
afford the administrative complexity, jury confusion, and other costs of
having accident cases pleaded and tried simultaneously in negligence
and strict liability.
Jon T. Hirschoff
Guido Calabresi's comment looks back on the objectives we had in mind
when we set out to write Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts. I would
like to consider instead some implications of our article which I am not sure
we had in mind.
We suggested that in formulating a test for strict liability for product
defects, courts should look to factors such as knowledge of the risk (and thus
adequacy of warning) and appropriateness of use to determine who was in the
best position, with respect to the accident risk, to make a cost-benefit analysis
and act upon it. Such factors, we pointed out, are commonly mentioned in
assumption of risk cases and in traditional strict liability cases. In many of these
cases, liability turns not on whether thedefendant and plaintiff ought to have
acted as they did, but rather on who was in a better position to perceive the
risk, make the cost-benefit analysis, and act upon it.
A question worth examining, I think, is whether a test like ours could serve
as a more general test for liability for accident risks, facilitating the eventual
148. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
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